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Existing research strongly suggests that age-related changes in the cognitive system influence
preferential choice. While the reduction of fluid cognitive ability can lead to sub-optimal decision
outcomes (Finucane et al., 2000), experience garnered during one’s lifespan can also improve one’s
decision making (Mata et al., 2007; Bruine de Bruin et al., 2014). How can research on aging
and decision making explain such mixed results? A reasonable approach is to adhere to a clear
definition of optimality in choice behavior, which must be grounded in principles of cognitive
psychology. Indeed, this approach has led many researchers to identify distinct cognitive processes
that may be responsible for suboptimal decisions among older adults. Among many, these include
memory (Buckner, 2004), perception (Schneider and Pichora-Fuller, 2000), and executive functions
(Schiebener and Brand, 2015).
In this special issue, Koscielniak et al. (2016) focus on the effect of aging on risky choice.
Comparing the performance of two age groups, they found that older female adults exhibit a lower
propensity to take risks on the Balloon Analog Risk Task (BART). At the same time, their results
showed that both younger and older females adapt to initial failures and successes and are capable
of adjusting their risk taking behavior over the course of repeated trials. Koscielniak et al. (2016)
positioned their findings within the broader framework of the dual-system reasoning, attributing
the overall poor performance of older adults to a “decline in deliberative processes” (p. 6).
In this commentary, I offer a cautionary note about the reliance on such theoretical
frameworks to make predictions about the cognitive underpinnings of preferential choice. While
the conclusions drawn by the authors are supported by their data, the use of verbal (i.e., not
quantitative, Lewandowsky and Farrell, 2011) theories can lead to erroneous inferences. Instead,
future advances should rely on cognitive modeling to decouple competing mechanisms that can
give rise to differences in choices between younger and older adults. In challenging verbal and
descriptive (i.e., statistical) models in study of risky choice and aging, many now argue that
cognitive modeling removes ambiguity associated with the interpretation of cognitive processes
(Lewandowsky and Farrell, 2011). In the case of the BART itself, several models have been
proposed, each specifying specific cognitive mechanisms behind decisions to either pump or to
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secure one’s earnings (Wallsten et al., 2005; Schmitz et al., 2016).
In a 4-parameter version of the model by Wallsten et al. (2005),
for example, α and µ parameters control the learning rate at
which one’s belief that a balloon will burst on a given trial is
updated, γ+ represents the general propensity to take risks, and
β captures the behavioral consistency of the agents. Crucially,
Wallsten and colleagues showed that parameters recovered
in their study correlated with self-reported indices of risky
behaviors, supporting the view that their specification of the
model captures the cognitive components of risk taking in BART
(but see a discussion of alternative models by van Ravenzwaaij
et al., 2011). In fact, research has found that the differences
between young and old on BART performance can be attributed
to heightened reward-sensitivity and the initial perception of
risk (Cavanagh et al., 2012), as opposed to differences in the
ability to update beliefs based on observed outcomes (Rolison
et al., 2012). These results are consistent with the efforts
of Koscielniak et al. (2016), but the results of model fitting
present a clear advantage over verbal theories for a number of
reasons.
First, interpretable parameters of the model applied to BART
can be used to draw parallels with other areas in which the
effect of aging has been studied. Comparisons with performance
on other risk tasks (and of other populations) can produce
converging evidence about the cognitive processes involved. This
is particularly important as it reduces the chance that a particular
paradigm (e.g., BART) becomes the subject of empirical research
in itself. Second, cognitive modeling can lead to alternative
interpretations concerning risky choice. To illustrate this point,
consider a widely held belief about the negative correlation
between cognitive ability and risk aversion (e.g., Dohmen et al.,
2010). Recent findings by Andersson et al. (2013) showed that
this association is in fact spurious and simply reflects an increased
rate of random choice among those with lower cognitive ability.
Although the authors did not use cognitive modeling to illustrate
their finding, it is easy to see that in many cases such mistakes
could be avoided if a correctly specified model with a noise
parameter was fit to the data. In the context of BART and aging,
existing models can discern between noisiness of responding
and risk preferences, and they are therefore well equipped to
recover such patterns. Indeed, previous studies have found that
older adults are less consistent in their decisions (Finucane
et al., 2005). Finally, cognitive models can be extended to
study dynamic aspects of cognition. Much work has applied
drift diffusion models to understand cognitive performance of
younger and older adults on a range of tasks (Ratcliff et al.,
2006; McKoon and Ratcliff, 2013). Such models take into account
response times and can therefore tell us more about the time-
accuracy tradeoffs involved in a decision process. This modeling
approach is particularly suitable for studying the effects of aging,
as older participants often adapt their strategies to account for
the decline in their fluid cognitive ability (Smith and Brewer,
1995).
In sum, Koscielniak et al. (2016) contribute to the
understanding of how cognitive and motivational factors
influence preferential choice at different ages. This commentary
highlights the fact that future research can build on these findings
using cognitive modeling techniques to identify specific aspects
of the cognitive process that impact risk preferences among
young and old adults. Such efforts correspond to a shift from
verbal and descriptive models toward quantitative models of
cognition.
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